

The Conception of Self in English Association Psychology

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Preface

In the following pages an attempt has been made to work out the conception of self from the writings of the two Mills, Hamilton, Spencer and Bain. The title „The Conception of Self in the English Association Psychology“ given to the work, is inappropriate in so far as Hamilton cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be brought into the fold of association psychologists. He belongs, in fact, to the opponent school — the a priori school (represented by the Common Sense philosophy), while the Associationists constitute the a posteriori school. But still he has been here included.

The reasons for doing so are as follows. Firstly, the two lines of thought — the a priori and the a posteriori — flourished side by side and each contributed a good deal to the development of the other. Hamilton's psychology constitutes, as it were, a complement to the association psychology. An important question in the history of psychology has been, to say it in the words of Brett: „Whether the synthetic activity of the ego or the associative power of the ideas (as elements of consciousness) is to be emphasised“. Hamilton did the first thing, the Associationists the second. The one complements the other.

And then Hamilton, in fact, is so important to understand J. S. Mill. It is very likely that the latter in his doctrine of the ego was influenced by the former.

For these reasons it has been thought proper to treat Hamilton along with the Associationists.

Chapter I

Introduction

We are here primarily concerned with the subject of Self in the works of the two Mills, Hamilton, H. Spencer and Bain. The inquiry is limited only to the purely psychological side of the question.

But it is proper that a brief delineation of the character of the context of our authors be given here in the „Introduction“. They will be better understood by being taken in their proper setting. By far the most important line of thought present in the historical background; and which exercised a direct influence on most of the authors, to be dealt with here, is Empiricism (denial of all a priori element in experience and knowledge). And the most important figures of this way of thought, in the modern period, have been Locke, Berkeley and Hume. They provide the immediate historical context of our authors and exercised a direct influence on them. We may, therefore, give a brief account of their systems of thought, but more particularly of their opinion on the subject of Self.

Locke's principal philosophical work is his „Essay concerning Human Understanding“, first published in 1690. In his „Essay“ he wanted „to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with.“¹⁾ So that the direct point of inquiry is to ascertain the limitations of the human mind in its ability to know things. But it involves obviously the consideration of the general character of mind itself and the problem of existence. One, therefore, meets with in the Essay a discussion of epistemological, psychological and metaphysical questions.

The mind is conceived as originally a *tabula rasa*. And the whole structure of knowledge is ultimately drawn from „ideas“. Idea, Locke himself says, is any „object of the understanding“ or „what it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.“²⁾ Lockian ideas cover alike the sensations and ideas of modern English psychology.

¹⁾ Locke, „The Epistle to the Reader“ in the „Essay“.

²⁾ Locke, „Essay concerning Human Understanding“, Introduction § 8.

Ideas are distinguished into simple and complex. The former constitute the unanalysable factors of our experience. Complex are made up of the simple. Locke declares that the human mind „has all the materials of its knowledge from experience, that in that all our knowledge is founded and from that it all ultimately derives itself“. His method of inquiry is throughout the „Essay“ strikingly empirical. Brett in his „History of Psychology“ remarks, „only the method really belongs to his work as a whole; the rest is tentative and incidental. But the method is psychological“³⁾

His opinions on the subject of self may now be examined. Finite spirits are to him real metaphysical existences. The simple ideas of „thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, power of beginning motion, etc.“ conceived as „coexisting in some substance“ lead to the development of the complex idea of a finite spirit. Further „every act of sensation“, while giving knowledge that „there is some corporeal being without me“ also tells me that „there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears“.

But this spiritual being does not serve to explain the human selfhood or personal identity. Locke says, a person „is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflexion and can consider itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places“.⁴⁾ That is, a person is a self-conscious human individuality. This sense or consciousness of sameness „is inseparable from thinking“; and it seems to Locke to be „essential to it“. He adds, „it being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive“⁵⁾. Further, „since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity i. e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done“⁶⁾.

This consciousness covers the heat and the cold and the other affections of the body. „The limbs of his body are to everyone“, he says, „a part of himself: he sympathises and is concerned for them“.⁷⁾

Locke, in holding it impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive, shows that he did not regard consciousness and self-consciousness as two distinct states of mind, but that the latter was necessarily present with the former.

3) Brett, „History of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 258.

4) Locke, „Essay“ Bk. II, ch. XXVII, Sect. 9.

5) „ „ „ „ „

6) „ „ „ „ „

7) „ „ „ „ Sect. 11.

Then, it may be noted, that the self extends only to such experiences as are recognised by this consciousness (that of being the same self) to be belonging to it and the experiences that are not thus remembered are in no way a part of self.

We have above given an account of Locke's treatment of self. Two things may clearly be noticed in it. There is at first, affirmed an identity of the soul-substance. Its existence is inferred from such processes as „thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, power of beginning motion“. Further „every act of sensation“ gives it.

Here, it may be observed, that he is emphasising an activity or rather activising in mental life. The soul-substance appears to be more intimately connected with processes or activities. And then the expression „act of sensation“ is quite significant. But this way of talk is not consistent with his „new way of ideas“, according to which the whole structure of knowledge is to be evolved out of the combination and recombination of ideas. And an idea is, as we have already seen, any object of thought. So that consistency to his fundamental position does not permit him to go beyond the ideas. But here, as elsewhere also, he conducts himself like one who would rather be inconsistent in his theory than deny what appears to him to be real existence. The existence of soul is, as a matter of fact, admitted by him in such an attitude of mind. And the fact of activity in mind, which he emphasises in so many ways, is also the result of the same attitude of faithfulness to reality. Ideas are themselves passive objects. But there is an activity in the mind. Now without showing how activity is traceable from „ideas“, he simply admits it as a fact undeniably there.

Then, besides the identity of the soul-substance, there is an identity of person. The soul itself does not contribute anything to the determination of the individuality of the person. It is only a metaphysical existence, which he would not deny. The personal identity is otherwise altogether empirically explained. Every state of consciousness is accompanied by the consciousness of self, which is considered as „the same thinking thing in different times and places“. Now this consciousness of the same self is inseparable from thinking; „it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive“. And then by way of conclusion he says that this „consciousness makes personal identity“, which is not more than saying that personal identity makes personal identity.

But one thing is here rather important to note. Locke says that the consciousness of being the same self is inseparable from thinking. Now in doing so he is emphasising the fact of unity in mental life. But here again regardless of the point, whether it is consistent or not with his doctrine of ideas. Hume, as we shall see later, develops a view of self, which is the strict and legitimate

consequence of his standpoint. One thing further may also be noticed. Consciousness of self is there in every moment of mental life. Now the consciousness of self or self-consciousness is the same thing as the attitude of reflexion, which again and again in the „Essay“ receives the attention and consideration of Locke. But does his emphasis on self-consciousness and reflexion (subjective attitude) not detract from his doctrine of ideas, which is pure objectivism? And does he not in that way emphasise the inner activity in contrast to the merest combination and permutation of the ideas?

Thus in the treatment of the identity of soul as well as of the identity of person, his emphasis on the fact of unity and activity in mental life are quite pronounced, though in both cases it is done at the cost of consistency with his original position.

Personal identity is argued in another way as well. It arises out of the individual's actions and his responsibility. Now responsibility of an individual, says Locke, can only lie with respect to the actions of which he is conscious. That is to say, with regard to the actions, which are recognised by consciousness as belonging to the same self. But for the actions, which are not thus united into a person, the individual cannot be justly responsible. „Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person“. ⁸⁾ And Locke says, „Whatever has the consciousness of past and present actions, is the same person to whom they belong“. ⁹⁾

The point is here really the same as we have seen before also. Consciousness makes personal identity. It unites, in fact, all kinds of mental processes together and refers them to one person. Here individual's actions and responsibility are particularly considered to show how they stand related to this „consciousness“. To us, it is relevant here again, to point out Locke's emphasis on unity in mental life through his emphasis on the unity of actions.

Locke distinguishes his personal identity from the „identity of man“. Personal identity may extend even to events that took place before the birth of the organism. „Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self“ ¹⁰⁾

The identity of man, on the contrary, is the identity of a particular organism. A man has a soul. But „the body too“, he says,

⁸⁾ Alex Fraser's Edition of the Essay, Bk. II, ch. XXVII (marginal remark of Fraser).

⁹⁾ „Essay“, Bk. II, ch. XXVII.

¹⁰⁾ „Essay“, Bk. II, ch. XXVII, sect. 16.

„goes to the making of man“ So that soul and body are both essential to the individuality of man. And, therefore, with death the individuality of man will come to an end; and before birth it did not have an existence. But personal identity may relate to things that took place before the birth of the organism and may be carried over to future states of existence of the soul, if the consciousness before referred to continues to live.

Here, it may be recalled, that Locke has before in treating of personal identity said that „the limbs of his body are to everyone a part of himself“. Then body is involved in both personal identity as well as the identity of man. But, it may be here remarked, that to the latter it belongs as an essential determinant factor, while it is not so in the case of the former. Personal identity, we have said, may extend to events that took place before the birth of the organism and may be carried over to future states of existence of the soul after the death of the organism.

Lastly, person is, Locke says, „a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same, and for the same reason that it does the present.“¹¹⁾

Locke's empiricism receives a further development at the hands of Berkeley. But the „doctrine of ideas“ of Locke, which he accepted, is made use of by him to refute materialism and atheism. What we may here note is that the simple ideas are recognised by him also as the ultimate source and constituents of knowledge.

„A spirit“, says Berkeley, „is one simple undivided active being, — as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive or inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of images or likeness, that which acts.“¹²⁾ Thus though no ideas can represent the spirit, still through the effects that it produces, we can perceive it. Spirit, Berkeley says, „cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects, which it produceth.“¹³⁾

An idea of the soul is held to be an impossibility. But it is all the same admitted „that we have some notion of the soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind; such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.“¹⁴⁾

11) „Essay“, Bk. II, ch. XXVII, sect. 26.

12) Berkeley, „The Principles of Human Knowledge“, Sect. 27.

13) ” ” ” ” ” ” ”
14) ” ” ” ” ” ” ”

And regarding the use of the words — idea and notion — it may be read: „I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names.“¹⁵⁾ Then there are two sources of knowledge with Berkeley: „ideas“ and „notion“. Ideas give us a world which is capable of being represented in sensations. But of my „Self“ I can have no sensation; and I am still directly aware of an active existence in my mind. This other way of becoming aware — which is applicable only to an individual's soul — is the way of notion. But this second source appears to be an after-thought with Berkeley, just to provide for the existence of the soul.

His argument regarding the existence of the soul, given in another context, may also be examined. He supposes that it may be objected that while we have got no idea of the soul, therefore, the soul is wholly insignificant. His reply is that what I mean by the term „I“ is the same as that I mean by the „soul“. And to say „that I was nothing or that I was an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these propositions“. ¹⁶⁾

There is still another argument for the existence of the soul. The ideas are the objects of knowledge. But there must be something that perceives or knows them. And that is the soul or spirit. ¹⁷⁾

But it is here important to note that Berkeley explicitly recognises, and, as a matter of fact, strongly emphasises the unity and activity in mental life. Ideas are themselves passive. They are, therefore, not capable of representing „by way of image or likeness“, the active subject that perceives and knows. Activity and unity are both the attributes of the subject or the spirit. Further, what is active cannot be represented in idea i. e. cannot be object, but it can be known through its effects. ¹⁸⁾

These are the most important issues of Berkeley's opinions on self. But exactly what is important on the subject is not quite consistent with his original position. Ideas are to him also, as they were to Locke, the one source of all knowledge. Now if he remained faithful to his ideas, which are passive objects in the mind, as the only source of all knowledge, how could he at all get at an

¹⁵⁾ Berkeley, „The Principles of Human Knowledge“, Sect. 142.

¹⁶⁾ Berkeley, „Principles“, Sect. 39.

¹⁷⁾ Berkeley, „Principles“, Sect. 2.

¹⁸⁾ Eisler, „Philosophen-Lexikon“, 1912, p. 62:

„Da der Geist aktiv, die „Idee“ passiv ist, so kann es von einem Geist kein Vorstellungsbild, nur einen „Begriff“ („notion“) geben, indem der Geist vermittelt seiner Wirkungen erkannt wird, und wir wissen, was das Wort „Geist“ bedeutet.“

active unitary spirit? But other motives have come in which made the existence of a soul sacred to him.

We will presently see how all kinds of extraneous motives were kept away by Hume to show the real consequences of the idea theory.

In Hume the English empiricism reaches its culmination. He opens the first section of his „Treatise“ with the sentence: „All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas.“¹⁹⁾ By perception he means any mental process. Further „since all ideas are derived from impression, and are nothing but copies and representations of them“²⁰⁾ the one last ground of our knowledge is that of impressions. And anything from which we can have no impression cannot possess any reality for us. But the self gives us no one impression. There is nothing like the impression of self as there are of red, blue, sweet, sour etc. Hume says, „for my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure“.²¹⁾ So that there is no impression of the self, they are of heat, cold etc.

Therefore there is no self as an entity that continues invariably the same through all the manifold changes of mental life, there being no one identical impression corresponding to one identical self.

He then states his own view of the character of human self. He says that the self is „nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement“.²²⁾

But the more important question is, how does the sense of sameness or of identity come to link the various successive perceptions, the sum of which constitutes a person or self?

His explanation is like this: „That action of the imagination, by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects are almost the same to the feeling. The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continued object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake and makes us substitute the notion of identity instead of that of related objects“.²³⁾

The self is thus nothing but a succession of related perceptions. These perceptions, because of the relations subsisting between

¹⁹⁾ Hume, „Treatise of Human Nature“, Bk. I, Pt. I, Sect. I.

²⁰⁾ Hume, „Treatise of Human Nature“, Bk. I, Pt. I, Sect. VII.

²¹⁾ Hume, „Treatise of Human Nature“, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sect. VI.

²²⁾ Hume, „Treatise“, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sect. VI.

²³⁾ Hume, „Treatise“, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sect. VI.

them, afford easy transition to the mind from one to the other and therefore the mind comes to regard them the same by the force of a habit or belief that is thus engendered. It is, in the end then, still a unity and identity returned to human life, but it may be borne in mind that it is due to a habit and belief involving a confusion or mistake.

Hume's opinions are the consequence of certain premisses of his. And it will be interesting to analyse them here. Firstly, the mental phenomena is looked at by him as if it were an entirely objective fact like that of the physical nature. This shuts out of his mind altogether the working of activity in mind. And then the impressions are treated as independent units standing in different relations to one another. Naturally then the unity of mind escapes his attention. And starting with such premisses, which involve a denial of continuity and unity, it was not possible to find a right place for them at the end.

Chapter II

The Two Mills

I

„The analytical study of the facts of the human mind began with Aristotle; it was carried to considerable height by Hobbes and Locke, who are real founders of that view of mind, which regards the greater part of its intellectual structure as having been built up by experience.“¹⁾ And further „Dr. Hartley was the man of genius who first clearly discerned“ that in the law of the Association of ideas consisted „the key to the explanation of the more complex mental phenomena“. ²⁾ Thus writes J. S. Mill in his preface to his father's work. And then J. Mill is, in his judgment, „the reviver and the second founder of the Association psychology“.

Associationism speaks through every chapter of the „Analysis“. „The feelings (sensations) which we have through the external senses are the most simple, at least the most familiar, of the mental phenomena“. ³⁾ And „a distinct knowledge of the elements is indispensable to an accurate conception of that which is compounded of them“. ⁴⁾ Therefore he begins with the treatment of sensations. Ideas are nothing but „traces“ and „copies“ of sensations. And the two — sensations and ideas — represent „the two primary states of consciousness“. They combine in various ways to make up the more complex states. The laws of the association of ideas provide the ways of their combination. Thus are conception, imagination, memory, belief, volition etc. explained without in the least admitting or requiring the operation of activity. Sensations, ideas, and the laws of association suffice to explain all feelings ⁵⁾ This is, as Brett says, „pure associationism.“

¹⁾ Preface to J. Mill's „Analysis of the Phenomena of Human Mind“ by J. S. Mill (II. ed. 1878) p. X.

²⁾ Preface to the „Analysis“ p. XI.

³⁾ „Analysis“, p. 1.

⁴⁾ „Analysis“, p. 1.

⁵⁾ „The word „feeling“, according to him, includes every „phenomenon of the mind“ our experience is either a knowledge of the feelings

„The life of one man is one series. The life of another man is another series. When I say then, that a man is the same, I merely express my belief in one of those series; belief that the particular man, of the present instant, is the last link of such and such a chain, and not of any other“. Apparently the „Chain“ of Mill is equal to the „Bundle“ and the „Sum-total“ of Hume. And the one is as much atomistic in its conception of mind as the other.

The individual is a „chain“; and the belief of the same chain is personal identity. But the identity of myself and of other persons cannot be explained alike. In spite of strong similarities there are still some differences.

„The memory which I have of my own existence, that is, the memory of certain train of antecedents and consequents, is the belief of them; on account of which belief, I apply to myself the term same, in the same way as I apply it to any other of my fellowmen.“⁶⁾

The antecedents and the consequents cover the successive states of the body also as they do of the mind.

The difference between the identity of other men and myself he accounts for as follows: „In the case of other men, it consists of observation and memory; in the case of myself, it consists of consciousness and memory“. ⁷⁾ Further: „The memory of a chain of facts observed, is the evidence in one case. The memory of a chain of states of consciousness is the evidence in the other“. ⁸⁾

According to Mill then „my self“ and „another self“ are to me pretty nearly alike. Thus „my self“ is as good an objective fact to me as „another self“.

J. Mill, it may be here observed, goes beyond Locke inasmuch as he recognises that my „self“ includes events which have otherwise dropped out of my memory. These events are admitted to belong to me on the strength of certain kinds of evidences; testimony etc.

We find from above that memory is quite important to Mill to explain self. We may therefore relevantly say a few words regarding his conception of the nature of memory. Memory involves association. Something present recalls something else that was once present to the mind. But the recollection of a sensation or idea alone does not constitute the whole fact of memory. Recognition of its having been experienced before must also be there. And recognition is a „highly complex idea“, which consists of three principal ingredients: „1. the point of consciousness called the remembering

separately or „a knowledge of the order in which they follow each other; and this is all.“

Leslie Stephan — „The English Utilitarians“, 1900, vol. II, p. 290.

⁶⁾ J. Mill, „Analysis“, vol. II, p. 168.

⁷⁾ J. Mill „Analysis“, vol. II, p. 169.

⁸⁾ J. Mill „Analysis“, vol. II, p. 169.

self; 2. the point of consciousness called the percipient self; 3. the successive states of consciousness which fill up the interval between these two points.“⁹⁾ The interval is filled up with associations, which connect the two selves. At another place he says the same thing quite briefly like this: „ . . . in Memory, there is not only the idea of the thing remembered; there is also the idea of my having seen it“. ¹⁰⁾

About retention as a feature of memory there is no express mention. But the entire account permits of such an interpretation that the experiences as they pass away are retained — how? and where? that cannot be said. — And when the suitable association is there, they are recalled and recognised.

From the above it is clear that self forms an important moment in memory and also vice versa; as we have seen before.

We may also note that belief too is an important moment in personal identity. Identity is in reality only „a certain case of belief“. And belief is association between ideas.¹¹⁾ ¹²⁾ J. S. Mill at the end of the chapter on belief in the „Analysis“ remarks, „the analysis of Belief presented in this chapter brings out the conclusion that all cases of Belief are simply cases of indissoluble association . . . that to believe a succession or coexistence between two facts is only to have two ideas of the two facts so strongly and closely associated, that we cannot help having the one when we have the other.“ ¹³⁾

Lastly it may be remarked that Mill's treatment of self is practically identical with that of Hume. Both of them regard self as consisting of a succession of mental states. Now from a merest succession of disparate states arises a belief that they are all of one and the same person or belong to one and the same person. So far their accounts agree. But they differ in regard to the manner in which the belief of personal identity arises. With Hume it is like this: The action of imagination by which we consider one and the continued object and by which we reflect on a succession of related objects is the same. Hence we confuse the two. Thus we substitute an identity of mind in place of a succession of mental states. With Mill the belief in personal identity is, as we have seen a little above, due to association. The various states of mind

⁹⁾ J. Mill „Analysis“, vol. I, p. 335.

¹⁰⁾ J. Mill „Analysis“, vol. I, p. 329.

¹¹⁾ „ . . . belief not only depends upon, but actually is association“.

L. Stephan „English Utilitarians“, Vol. II, p. 300.

¹²⁾ „Gewisse Vorstellungsverbindungen werden durch häufige Wiederholung unlösbar, daher führen sie sichere Ueberzeugung (belief) mit sich und erscheinen schließlich als Einheiten, den chemischen Verbindungen ähnlich. (mental chemistry)“. — Jonas Cohn, „Geschichte d. Philosophie“ VII. Teil, Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, 1925, p. 21.

¹³⁾ „Analysis“, Vol. I. p. 402.

associating together develop the consciousness of being one and the same person.

II

J. S. Mill wrote no purely psychological work.¹⁴⁾ His interest was pre-eminently methodological. Therefore his views on various psychological subjects are found scattered throughout his writings.

In the general character of his psychological outlook he falls in line with Hume and J. Mill. He is an associationist and, on the whole, he attempted to evolve the entire mental phenomena from sensations, ideas and the laws of the association of ideas.

Mill's views on the subject of self are to be found particularly in his „Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy“ (ch. XII, The psychological theory of the belief in Matter, How far applicable to Mind); and his commentary note on „Identity“ in J. Mill's „Analysis“ (Vol. II, p. 172).

The statements of Mill regarding the character of self require a careful examination. They are not all of a strictly coherent character. Certain statements, if taken by themselves would reduce him to the position of Hume and J. Mill. For example, at one place he holds „Mind as nothing but the series of our sensations . . . with the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling . . .“¹⁵⁾ Again there is a statement: „The theory, therefore, which resolves mind into a series of feelings, with a background of possibilities of feelings, can effectually withstand the most invidious of the arguments directed against it“.¹⁶⁾ Such is, as a matter of fact, the impression that his chapter in the „Examination“ leaves on the mind of the reader. Mind is a series of feelings with infinite possibilities of these feelings. It must be these statements that could entitle Thilly to make the remark: „With Hume and J. Mill, he (J. S. Mill) calls mind a series of feelings.“¹⁷⁾ „Feeling“ means to him, as it did to his father, an expression for every kind of mental process.

But Mill seeks to go deeper in his analysis and there he is faced with doubt and difficulty. He says, „The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations“.¹⁸⁾ Now what are they? In themselves they are states of consciousness, like anyother. But then each of them „involves a

¹⁴⁾ „In his own direct contribution to psychology he (J. S. Mill) attempted no minute analysis or systematic collection of data“. Brett, „History of Psychology 1921, Vol. III, p. 219.

¹⁵⁾ „Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy“ p. 236.

¹⁶⁾ „Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy“ 3rd ed., 1867, p. 241.

¹⁷⁾ Thilly, „History of Philosophy“, p. 526.

¹⁸⁾ „Examination“ p. 241.

belief in more than its own present existence"¹⁹⁾ inasmuch as a memory implies that the present process is a representation of what „actually existed in the past; and an expectation implies the realisation of an experience in the future“. Further he feels that they include the belief „that I myself formerly had, or that I myself, and no other shall hereafter have the sensations remembered or expected“. ²⁰⁾

These considerations pave the way to his tone of indecisiveness, that one meets with about the close of the above-mentioned chapter. For he says, „If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series“. ²¹⁾ Further it is interesting to read another sentence from him because it shows the appreciation of the point of difficulty. „The true incomprehensibility perhaps is“, he says, „that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner present: that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality.“ ²²⁾

His final attitude is given in the sentence, which closes up the treatment of the subject in the chapter. „I think, by far the wisest thing to do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place; and when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assumes a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning“. ²³⁾ Here one sees in what reserve and indecisiveness he holds himself.

But in the „Appendix“ that follows the chapter and the commentary note in J. Mill's work, the trend of thought is not exactly the same.

In the latter there is nothing that is not contained in the „Appendix“. It is also important to note that the exposition of the subject embodied in it is given to the world as a further and a clearer treatment of self. For, quite by way of opening the discussion, he says, „since the state in which I profess to leave the question has been so ill understood, it is incumbent on me to explain myself more fully“. ²⁴⁾

¹⁹⁾ „Examination“ p. 241.

²⁰⁾ „Examination“ p. 241.

²¹⁾ „Examination“ p. 242.

²²⁾ „Examination“ p. 242.

²³⁾ „Examination“ p. 242.

²⁴⁾ „Examination“, p. 255.

Here is a very definite statement. He says, „the fact which alone necessitates the belief in an ego the one fact which the psychological theory cannot explain is the fact of memory“. Expectation being „psychologically a consequence of memory“. And then a corollary is drawn from above. He says, „I see no reason to think that there is any cognizance of an Ego until memory commences“.

In his editorial notes on J. Mill's work he emphasises with a special force the intimacy of the relationship between self and memory. He says, „The phenomena of self and that of memory are merely two sides of the same fact, we may, in treating of memory say that it is the idea of a past sensation associated with the idea of myself as having it, or we may say, in treating of Identity that the meaning of self is the memory of certain past sensation“. ²⁵⁾

Memory again here, as it did with J. Mill, plays an important part. We may, therefore, attempt to give S. Mill's conception of memory. For the most part he agrees with his father's opinion on the subject. But a few things are quite his own. He says, „To complete the memory of seeing the thing, I must not only have the idea of the thing, and the idea of my having seen it, but the belief of my having seen it; and even this is not always enough; for I may believe on the authority of others that I have seen a thing which I have no remembrance of seeing“. ²⁶⁾ Here is a clearer statement also: Memory is „having the idea recalled along with the Belief that the fact which it is the idea of, really happened, and moreover happened to myself. Memory, therefore, by the very fact of its being different from imagination, implies an Ego who formerly experienced the facts remembered, and who was the same Ego then as now“. ²⁷⁾ This is a very positive statement. An Ego is definitely implied in memory. But, in fact, this is not the true attitude of Mill. He is very much in doubt regarding the existence of an ego. His associationism does not easily permit it and still he feels the necessity of it. But it is definite that he feels the need of an ego, which is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series for memory and for personal identity. This J. Mill never felt.

The relationship between memory and self suggests to Mill a point, which constitutes a point of difference between him and his father. James Mill holds that consciousness of self is involved in every mental process ²⁸⁾ But J. S. Mill holds the supposition of a being gifted with sensation, but devoid of memory,

²⁵⁾ „Analysis“, Vol. II, ch. XIV, p. 174.

²⁶⁾ „Analysis“, Vol. I, p. 329, Footnote.

²⁷⁾ „Analysis“, Vol. II, p. 174.

²⁸⁾ „The consciousness of the present moment is not absolutely simple; for, whether I have a sensation or idea, the idea of what I call Myself is always inseparably combined with it.“ „Analysis“, Vol. I, p. 337.

valid. Such a being would have sensations without any self-reference, because „the notion of self“ is „a consequence of memory“ and memory fails in this case. Hence he concludes that the consciousness of self may not be involved in every mental process.

In man also „in all probability“ it does not exist „in the beginning“. But „from a very early period of our existence“ it is there, „though like many other mental processes, it often takes place too rapidly to be remembered at the next instant.“

Further on, in the „Appendix“, we meet with something that is new and positive. Now he speaks, with greater emphasis, of the „inexplicable tie“ and the „organic union“ that binds the „series of feelings“ together. He says, „We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other part by something in common, which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the first and fiftieth, this common element is a permanent element.“²⁹⁾ Here a sentence from his note in J. Mill's work may also be read. „ . . . there is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series, which makes me say that they were feelings of a person who was the same person throughout, and a different person from those who had any of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me, constitutes my Ego“. ³⁰⁾ And there the question is allowed to rest. „The feelings or consciousnesses which belong or have belonged to it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted of self — the only positive attributes except permanence, which we can ascribe to it“. ³¹⁾

Thus one can see the difference between his position in the „chapter“ and then later in the „Appendix“. In the former he is inclined to regard self as a „series of feelings“, but which is „aware of itself as a series“; in the latter, he emphasises above all „a common element“ among the feelings which is „a permanent element“.

This difference constitutes an important point. It is, in reality, a deviation from strict associationism and obviously intended as an improvement upon it. Even in the former position a „series of feelings“ is by itself inadequate to constitute self. He feels the necessity of something besides the series, which is aware of the series as such. ³²⁾ And in the absence of a more satisfactory explanation,

²⁹⁾ „Examination“ p. 257.

³⁰⁾ „Analysis“, Vol. II, p. 175.

³¹⁾ „Examination“ p. 257.

³²⁾ „Sei das Ich nur eine Reihe von Bewußtseinsvorgängen, so sei es wenigstens eine Reihe, welche sich selbst als vergangen und werdend bewußt sei.“ Ueberweg-Hicks, Bd. V, 1928 p. 98.

he accepts „a series of feelings“ which „can be aware of itself as a series“. ³³⁾

In the „Appendix“, to all appearances, this is rejected. A series conscious of itself does not suffice. Mill, therefore, propounds a comparatively new theory of a „common“ and a „permanent element“ besides the series. But it may still be present in the „series“ as an objective fact. It knows the „series“ but is, perhaps, still something that belongs to the known. The ground of such doubts exists in his attitude of thorough objectivism. His outlook with regard to the character of mind is as strictly objective as that of Hume or of J. Mill. In any case his original standpoint was theirs. Hence one feels very diffident in thinking of it as a subject apart from the objects.

But the conception of the „common“ and the „permanent element“ among the series is not elaborated upon by Mill. One cannot, therefore, very definitely speak as to the functions of this element. Does he through this element intend to supply a factor of activity, which the associationists ordinarily do not take note of? He himself says nothing directly on the point. But there are evidences which lead to certain relevant inferences. Mill in a criticism of Bain's psychology says: „Those who have studied the writings of the associationist psychologists must often have been unfavourably impressed by the almost total absence, in their analytical expositions,

But that Mill refers to an „ego“ or a „common“ and „permanent element“ in the series, there is no mention of it. L. Stephan, who is quoted subsequently also takes no notice of it.

³³⁾ „The mind, in the phrase adopted from his father, is a „thread of consciousness“. It is a series of feelings with the curious peculiarity that besides „present sensations“ it has „memories and expectations“. What are these? he asks. They involve beliefs in something „beyond themselves“. If we call the mind „a series of feelings“, we have to add that it is a series which is „aware of itself as past and future“. Is it, then, something different from the feelings, or must we accept the paradox that something „which in hypothesis is a series of feelings“ can be aware of itself as a series? Here is the final „inexplicability“ which must arrive, as he admits with Hamilton, when we get to an ultimate fact. The „wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact without any theory of how it takes place“. That what we call personal identity is „inexplicable“ will hardly be denied. Yet Mill's position seems to make the paradox something nearly approaching to a contradiction. If the mental processes are to be described as feelings, separable but simply forming clusters more or less complicated and linked to each other, we seem to get rid not only of a something which organises experience, but of organisation itself. It becomes difficult to understand not merely what the mind or soul can be, but what are the mental processes to which the conception corresponds.“ — L. Stephan, „Eng. Utilitarians“, Vol. III, p 408.

It is rather strange that L. Stephan, in treating of Mill's conception of self, takes no account of Mill's mention of an „ego“ or the „common“ and „permanent element“.

of the recognition of any active element, or spontaneity in the mind itself". This defect was remedied by Bain and therein, says Mill, consists „the first capital improvement“ made by him.

This shows his keen awareness of the necessity of an active element in the mind.³⁴⁾ A remark of Brett is here important. „Stuart Mill was restless on the subject of passivity; he lost no opportunity of saying that his esteemed father had overlooked it, and congratulated Mr. Bain on having noticed it.“

In the light of these further considerations, it will perhaps be not unreasonable to infer that the „common“ and the „permanent element“ of Mill is an active principle in consciousness, which gives to a „series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future“, the reality of „a single present conception“. But it must be borne in mind, that it is not in the least metaphysically conceived. The element is an empirical fact.

We have above thought of the „common“ and the „permanent element“ as perhaps still belonging to the objects. Here we have felt that this may be the factor of activity in mind. Then also, when activity is attributed to it, it is very difficult to affirm that it no longer belongs to the objects. It may still be out of them. But a definite statement, it is very difficult to make, because Mill himself did not elaborate upon his concept of the ego.

Another point, with regard to the ego or the common and the permanent element of Mill may also be noted. We have said above that it perhaps provides for activity in mind. But more definitely it provides for unity in mind. It is obviously intended to do so. We have seen before that memory presents a serious problem to Mill.³⁵⁾ He finds it incomprehensible how „a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality“. Here he sees that a unity in the series is a fact. And in the recognition of this fact of unity in mind consists a special merit of Mill. This unity he wanted to explain

³⁴⁾ „Activily cannot possibly be generated from passive elements; a primitive active element must be found somewhere; . . .“ J. S. Mill, Discussions, vol. II, p. 120. 1867.

This provides a positive proof on the point. His notes on the subject of „will“ in James Mill's work also do the same. On the strength of these notes E. Wentscher in her „Das Problem des Empirismus“ p. 67) affirms that Mill recognised „willing“ as an ultimate function of the mind. She says, for example, „unlösbare letzte Bewußtseinsmomente findet Mill ferner im Gebiet des Wollens.“

³⁵⁾ „ Das Phänomen des Gedächtnisses glaubt er nicht weiter auf Association zurückführen zu können“. G. W. Störriing „J. S. Mill's Theorie über den psychologischen Ursprung des Vulgärglaubens an die Außenwelt“, 1889, p. 11.

through his conception of a series, which is aware of itself as a series and later through the conception of a permanent element or ego. But it may be pointed out that these conceptions do not stand consistently with his original position.

Mill's treatment of self, as we have examined above, involves a departure from the position of strict associationism. His talk of an ego, which is a common and a permanent element among the series, is obviously no association psychology. What factors, may we here venture to surmise, have tended to determine this change in outlook. Of course it will be said his intellectual ability, his deep insight into the character of human mind is the main factor. But is it not also likely that here he was influenced by his opponent, Hamilton? The conjecture becomes more probable, when we remember that Mill was very broad and open-minded in his outlook and that the doctrine of Ego stands quite in the centre of Hamilton's philosophy, to which the former must have closely applied himself, to be able to have written his „Examination“. It is, therefore, not unlikely that Mill was unconsciously influenced by Hamilton with regard to his doctrine of ego.³⁶⁾

In the end, a point of dispute to which J. S. Mill and A. Comte were parties may be considered. It is a point regarding the consciousness of self. Whether I can observe or attend to my own mental process or not? Comte's position is that it is not possible to observe our own mental process. Our knowledge of the mental process must be acquired by observing other people. Our intelligence, according to him, can observe all other things but not itself. Self-observation would stop the process observed itself.

J. St. Mill holds the contrary view. He says that we can observe the mental operations of other people only after we have learnt from a knowledge of ourselves what the external signs mean in terms of mind. So that a direct knowledge of our own mind is presupposed in our ability to observe the mental operations of other people. Further he says that „the mind can not only be conscious of, but can attend to more than one, and even a considerable number of impressions at once.“³⁷⁾ He recognises that „attention is weakened by being divided“; and also that it is „a special difficulty in psychological observation“, but then „a difficulty is not an impossibility“. And then he argues that when it is not possible to observe a mental process at the moment of its occurrence, it can be done through

³⁶⁾ E. Wentscher in her article on Mill which appeared in the *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, Bd. 32, and in her book „Das Problem des Empirismus“ has very critically and thoroughly examined Mill's conception of self. Her conclusions and inferences are, as a matter of fact, the same, which have been here independently arrived at.

³⁷⁾ „A. Comte and Positivism“ by J. S. Mill, p. 64.

memory, when the impression is still fresh. And then also it will be direct knowledge. „Unless in one of these ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies to have, of what passes in our minds“. ³⁸⁾

³⁸⁾ „A. Comte and Positivism“ by J. S. Mill, p. 64.

Chapter III

Hamilton

England witnessed the growth and the development of two sharply contrasted lines of thought during the latter half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. Empiricism and rationalism (denial and affirmation of a priori factor in knowledge). The former is represented by Hartley, the Mills, Bain and Spencer; the last-named as the author of „Synthetic Philosophy“ shares partly the character of the other direction also. They are the successors of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The latter, by the Scottish school to which Sir W. Hamilton belongs. The Scottish school developed, in opposition to the Empirical way of thinking, under German inspiration an idealistic way of thought called the philosophy of Common Sense. The school is pre-eminently philosophical; „for psychology it did but little“. ¹⁾

On the contrary, the empirical thinkers have naturally dwelt on psychological problems.

The same thing may also be read in the words of Ribot, the author of „La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine“. He writes, „de nos jours, il s'y est produit deux courants de doctrines: d'une part, L'École a priori représentée par Sir W. Hamilton, le Dr. Whewell, M. Mansel, M. Ferrier etc. . . . ; d'autre part l'École a posteriori (association Psychology) qui compte parmi ses adhérents les deux Mill, M. M. Bailey, Herbert Spencer, Bain, Lewes et bon nombre d'autres.“ ²⁾ A few words from Brett may also be in place here. He says, „The idealistic trend faintly perceptible in Thomas Brown and more obvious in Hamilton is a divergence from the path marked out by Hume and Hartley“ ³⁾, which was for psychology of much greater importance.

Characterising from the point of view of psychology, Brett at another place says, „The Scottish school, as a whole, recognises no

¹⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, (1921) Vol. III, p. 14.

²⁾ Ribot, „La psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine“, (1887) p. 46.

³⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, (1921) Vol. III, p. 29.

mechanical or physiological aspect of psychological processes. It remains distinctively within the limits of „Mental philosophy“. ⁴⁾

In spite of all these disqualifications — of course, more particularly from the point of view of Association psychology — of his school, which Hamilton also, more or less, possesses; he is still for us here of a special interest. In psychology there are two important issues: „Whether the synthetic activity of the ego or the associative power of the ideas (as elements of consciousness) is to be emphasised“. ⁵⁾ Hartley, the Mills etc. attempted to explain the whole structure of mind through ideas and their power of associating. Hamilton, on the other hand, emphasises the „synthetic activity of the ego“. And in that much he makes a necessary complement to associationism.

We may, now, consider the general character of his psychological standpoint. But before that, it may be mentioned that the principal source of his psychological opinions is his work, entitled „Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic“ (1836—38). He, therefore, chronologically, deserves a treatment after the elder Mill. But since J. S. Mill's opinions stand in such a close resemblance and direct development from his father's, therefore it has been preferred to treat the two together. And hence Hamilton after S. Mill.

W. Hamilton, in contrast to the Mills, who are associationists, is a faculty-psychologist. Ueberweg-Hicks in their „Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie“ write: „Hamiltons psychologische Erörterungen sind durchaus von der Seelenvermögens-Theorie abhängig“. ⁶⁾ Mind is conceived to be composed of a number of „faculties“ and „capacities“ „ . . . a faculty is nothing more than a general term for the causality the mind has of originating a certain class of energies“. ⁷⁾ And „a capacity only a general term for the susceptibility the mind has of being affected by a particular class of emotions“. ⁸⁾ These „faculties“ and „capacities“ are so many as there are the kinds of mental processes. So that there are quite a number of them coming into play under different conditions.

But it must be noticed that Hamilton emphasises that „the ultimate faculties of mind are not so many distinct and independent existences“. ⁹⁾ They are to be conceived as manifestations of the one and the same self. Thus he particularly emphasises the unity of the mind.

⁴⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, (1921) Vol. III, p. 14.

⁵⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, (1921) Vol. III, p. 29.

⁶⁾ Ueberweg-Hicks, „Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie“ (1928), Vol. V, p. 85.

⁷⁾ „Lectures on Metaphysics“, Lect. XX, (7th Ed.) (1882).

⁸⁾ „Lectures on Metaphysics“ Lect. XX.

⁹⁾ „Lectures on Metaphysics“ Lect. XXXIV.

Hamilton distinguishes himself further from the associationists, inasmuch as he says that „the first procedure of mind in the elaboration of its knowledge is always analytical. It descends from the whole to the parts, — from the vague to the definite“. ¹⁰⁾ Whereas the associationist proceeds to compound up the complex mental processes from the elementary sensations; and in that much he is synthetic in his method; Hamilton, on the contrary, proposes the proper method to be analytic. He gives evidence from experience to show that the „wholes“ are perceived first and the details later on. Children, for example, he says, „apprehend first the more obtrusive marks that separate species from species, and, in consequence of the notorious contrast of dress, men from women; but they do not as yet recognise the finer traits that discriminate individual from individual“. ¹¹⁾

Further another point of distinction. The laws of association are with the associationist very important, inasmuch as they provide the ways in which the sensations and ideas may be combined with one another. Hamilton recognises the fact of association in mind, but he looks at it from a different point of view. Not that there are sensations and ideas, as given individual facts, which combine; but that there is a whole that is given. Corresponding to the various laws of association, he proposes one law which is named as the law of Redintegration or Totality. The law is stated by him thus: „Those thoughts suggest each other which had previously constituted parts of the same entire or total act of cognition“. ¹²⁾ And further „Now to the same entire or total act belong, as integral or constituent parts, in the first place, those thoughts which arose at the same time, or in immediate consecution; and in the second, those thoughts which are bound up into one by their mental affinity“. ¹³⁾ Thus he makes his law of Totality cover simultaneity, by which he means co-existence or immediate consequence in time, and affinity, which is similarity.

This law he explains from „the still more universal principle of the unity of all our mental energies in general“. ¹⁴⁾ „The various acts of mind must not be viewed as single, — as isolated manifestations; they all belong to the one activity of the ego; and, consequently, if the various mental energies are only partial modification of the same general activity, they must all be associated among themselves.“ ¹⁵⁾ Here again, it may be noticed, his stress is on the unity of the mental phenomena.

¹⁰⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXVI.

¹¹⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXVI.

¹²⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXI.

¹³⁾ Hamilton, „Metaphysics“ Lect. XXXI.

¹⁴⁾ Hamilton, „Metaphysics“ Lect. XXXII.

¹⁵⁾ Hamilton, „Metaphysics“ Lect. XXXII.

Coming to the subject of self, we have first to note that the „Self“ or the „Ego“ or „Mind“ or „Conscious-subject“ in their own character „are all only expressions for the unknown basis of the mental phenomena“¹⁶⁾ As „substances“ both matter as well as mind are „unknown and unknowable“. They are knowable only as phenomena. Our knowledge, in other words, is limited to the relative; „of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing“. ¹⁷⁾ But the reality of mind as well as of matter, as substances, is accepted as valid, on the ground of „the veracity of our primary beliefs“.

The physical body or even the various modes of consciousness, do not enter into the constitution of self. He holds that „It is even not impossible to conceive me existing, deprived of every organ,“¹⁸⁾ The thoughts too are „only so many modes, appearances or phenomena“. But „I am a permanent being, an enduring subject“ Therefore these thoughts and organs belong to me; they do not constitute me.

But still the thoughts are in a way essentially connected with self. „I can conceive myself to exist apart from every organ“. But that cannot be done in the case of thoughts. „ of some thought it is necessary that I should be conscious, otherwise I can no longer conceive myself to be“. ¹⁹⁾ „I am, therefore“, he says, „essentially a thinking, — a conscious being“. Or, in other words, „ my character is that of an intelligence — an intelligence served by organs“. Organs, it may also be noticed, are then the means or the instruments of intelligence. The same idea one meets at another place as well. He says „ it is the mind always, which acts, be it through the medium of the senses“. Senses are, hence, related to the mind as its means.

Above, Hamilton has maintained that the self is „unknown and unknowable“. But one meets with statements from him which point to a different direction. We have just seen that the self is essentially a thinking being. Thought then not only implies the being of self, but, more than that, he says, it „is possible only in and through the consciousness of self“. ²⁰⁾ Further, „the self, the I, is recognised in every act of intelligence, as the subject to which that act belongs“. ²¹⁾ Here one does not feel that the self is altogether „the unknown and the unknowable“ thing.

Further on, one meets with even more definite statements. Consciousness is to Hamilton the widest term in psychology. The

¹⁶⁾ Hamilton, „Metaphysics“ Lect. IX.

¹⁷⁾ Hamilton, „Metaphysics“ Lect. VIII.

¹⁸⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. IX.

¹⁹⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. IX.

²⁰⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. IX.

²¹⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. IX.

various mental processes are only modes of consciousness. All the processes are „possible only under one condition. This element or condition is consciousness, or the knowledge that I, — that the Ego exists, in some determinate state“. Obviously one would infer that the knowledge of self is then present in every mental state.

Further, Consciousness implies, at the first instance, I know, I feel and I will, the three most general kinds of mental processes. Now what do they involve? To Hamilton, they necessarily imply, I know that I know, I know that I feel, and I know that I will. „For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know, — if I did not know that I felt, I would not feel, — if I did not know that I desired, I would not desire“. ²²⁾ And then he concludes „Consciousness is thus the self-affirmation, that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine“. ²³⁾ Self as known and knowable is obviously affirmed in these statements.

Another point may also be noticed here. Every state of consciousness is a state of self-consciousness. The latter is necessarily implied in the former.

There are still more statements of a similar character. Speaking about the duality of consciousness, Hamilton says, „we are immediately conscious in perception of an ego and a non-ego, known together, and known in contrast to each other.“ ²⁴⁾ And further, „the ego and non-ego, — mind and matter are not only given together but in absolute co-equality“. ²⁵⁾ Again we see that the self is known and knowable.

Lastly, we may quote a sentence from his treatment of „the faculty of self-consciousness“. Contrasting the external perception with the internal, he says, „the objects of the latter are apprehended by us in Time and Self; time and self are thus the two conditions, — the two fundamental forms, of Internal perception or self-consciousness“. ²⁶⁾ Here again the self is not unknown.

Above we have met with two kinds of opinions on self from Hamilton. Self, at first, is affirmed as only „unknown and unknowable.“ The existence of it is admitted to explain the fact of connection obtaining among the mental phenomena. To deny such an existence would be „to belie the veracity of our primary beliefs.“ This knowledge of self is inferred or mediate. And then there have been a series of statements, which imply an immediate knowledge of the self.

²²⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XI.

²³⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XI.

²⁴⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XVI.

²⁵⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XVI.

²⁶⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXIX.

Prof John Veith's observations, in this connection, may also be read. „I confess there seems to be some very considerable ambiguity in the doctrine of Hamilton regarding our knowledge of the Ego“. ²⁷⁾ On the point of the „mediate or inferential knowledge of the Ego“ he „cannot be said to be quite consistent“. ²⁷⁾ For „there are passages in which he seems to assert an immediate knowledge or consciousness of the Ego or self as well as of the states along with it“. ²⁷⁾

We may next proceed to consider his doctrine of personal identity. Personal identity means something more than the self, inasmuch as it implies a self, but also the belief with it that it is the same self. Personal identity, he says, „consists in the assurance . . . that our thinking Ego, notwithstanding the ceaseless changes of state . . . is essentially the same thing.“ Identity, we see, implies a relation between the successive states of a thing or better, as Hamilton says, it „is a relation between our cognitions of a thing and not between things themselves . . . a relation between a thing as known to exist at one time, and a thing as known to exist at another time“. ²⁸⁾

Though the idea of personal identity is accepted as a „deliverance of consciousness“ still there is an attempt to explain it through memory also. „The notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognised permanence and identity of the thinking subject in contrast to the recognised succession and variety of its modifications. But this recognition is possible only through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is memory“. ²⁹⁾

It may here help to go a little more closely into Hamilton's conception of memory. The first significant thing, in this connection, is to note that he calls memory „the conservative faculty“. Retention is the important feature. He says, „ . . . in the term Memory, the Conservative Faculty, — — the phenomena of Retention is the central notion, with which, however, those of Reproduction and Representation are associated.“ ³⁰⁾ By representation, he means, „the power the mind has of holding up vividly before itself the thoughts which, by the act of Reproduction, it has called into consciousness.“ ³¹⁾ Here a difference between him and the Mills may be noted. The Mills hardly took notice of the fact of retention, while

²⁷⁾ Prof. Veith's „Hamilton“ (1888) p. 92. (Philosophical Classics for English Readers' Series).

²⁸⁾ Works of Thomas Reid, edited by Hamilton. 8th Ed. Vol. I, p. 344, footnote.

²⁹⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XI.

³⁰⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXX.

³¹⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXIII.

to Hamilton it is the central concept in memory. The Mills, further, emphasised recognition, but that fails in Hamilton.

Now how does the retention of experiences take place? The experiences are retained as unconscious mental modifications. But the fact of retention is something quite natural „on the ground of the self-energy of mind“; „the conservation of the action of the mind being“, he says, „involved in the very conception of its power of self-activity“.³²⁾ „That every effect endures as long as it is not modified or opposed by any other effect“³²⁾, is, he says, „a universal law of nature“. „But the mental activity, the act of knowledge, of which I now speak, is more than this; it is an energy of the self-active power of a subject one and indivisible: consequently, a part of ego must be detached or annihilated, if a cognition once existent be again extinguished.“³²⁾

Hence the problem for him is more of forgetfulness than of memory. „Every mental activity belongs to the one vital activity of mind in general; it is, therefore, indivisibly bound up with it, and can neither be torn from, nor abolished in, it. But the mind is only capable, at any one moment, of exerting a certain quantity or degree of force.“³²⁾ This force will then be divided among the various activities of the mind. „Thus, in proportion to the greater number of activities in the mind, the less will be the proportion of force which will accrue to each; the feebler, therefore, each will be, and the fainter the vivacity with which it can affect self-consciousness“.³²⁾

It will appear from the above that absolute forgetfulness hardly exists. It is only more or less weakening of this or that activity of the mind.

After this little digression that we have made to consider rather closely Hamilton's conception of memory, we may return to examine the argument, giving the relationship between memory and self, quoted already. The argument is, in fact, rather involved. Now because „without memory our mental states could not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to self“; and because the idea of personal identity requires the recognition of the permanent subject in the succession and variety of mental states, therefore, memory is antecedent to the idea of self. The latter is hence the consequence of the former. But the idea of self, we have seen above also, is involved in consciousness. Therefore is memory also involved in consciousness. „By being involved“ is obviously meant „to be the necessary condition“ of a thing. It is then not quite clear how memory is the necessary condition of consciousness, which is, in reality, itself the ground condition of all kinds of mental processes.

But the argument may be looked at in another way also. And then the thing becomes much more intelligible. Here are three things

³²⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXX.

talked about: consciousness, memory and self. Hamilton's talk suggests a kind of relationship among them involving antecedence and consequence in existence. That creates difficulties. May it not be that they are, all the three, co-existent factors or rather phases of one and the same thing? A broader and more comprehensive consideration of Hamilton's statement makes such an interpretation quite a probable one.

From a closer examination of Hamilton's conception of memory, we have seen, that it is a mode of activity of the subject itself. Activity and its tendency to persist or to be retained are inseparable. And activity is the very essence of the subject. Thus one may judge whether it is at all possible to think of an antecedence and consequence between memory and self.

Further, from the same quotation, it appears that „the idea of self“ and „the idea of identical self“ are not clearly distinguished from each other.

We may, in the end, consider rather an important point of Hamilton's psychology. Mind is conceived by him to be essentially active. His entire psychology makes a repeated impression regarding the „self-activity“ of the subject. We have already said that the mind is constituted of a large number of „faculties“ and „capacities“. Faculties are „activities“ or „powers“ of the mind. „Capacities“ too are only relatively passive. We have also seen that the various „powers“ are not independent, „they all belong to the one activity of the ego, our various mental energies are only partial modifications of the same general activity,“³³⁾ The law of Redintegration, which applies to the entire phenomena of mind is also expressed in terms of activities and activity like this: „. . . . activities excite each other in proportion as they have previously belonged, as parts, to one whole activity“. ³⁴⁾ Statements can be indefinitely multiplied which bear testimony to the fact that to Hamilton mind is a unitary principle capable of self-activity. ³⁵⁾

³³⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXII.

³⁴⁾ „Metaphysics“, Lect. XXXII.

³⁵⁾ „Er (Hamilton) betont aber die Einheit und Identität des Subjekts. Das Subjekt verhält sich niemals gänzlich leidend, sogar im Schlafe ist eine gewisse Aktivität vorhanden.“ Ueberweg-Hicks „Geschichte der Philosophie“, Vol. V, p. 85.

Chapter IV

Herbert Spencer

Spencer holds a peculiar position with regard to the foregoing authors that we have so far treated (the Mills and Hamilton). He agrees with Hamilton, in his metaphysical belief, with regard to the unknowable character of the Ultimate Existence. And with the Mills he is an associationist in psychology. But the idea of evolution in its application to psychology and that of the physiological explanations of psychological facts are his own.

Spencer believed that all knowledge constitutes a unified system. The plan of his „Synthetic Philosophy“ was to demonstrate it. In his „First Principles“ he tried to show the most general truths lying at the bottom of all existence. Two important examples of such truths are: „The law of evolution“ and „the law of the conservation of force“. These and other fundamental truths of his „First Principles“ he later shows to be valid in the spheres of the special sciences: Biology, Psychology, Sociology etc. Thus the various departments of phenomena are governed by the same general laws. They, therefore, all together constitute a unified system of reality. Of this unified reality Spencer attempted to give a unified knowledge in his „Synthetic Philosophy“. Psychology, we can, then, expect will give us an application of the most general laws to the domain of mind. Or we might also say that psychology will further confirm that the laws valid in other departments of phenomena are valid with respect to mind also ¹⁾.

The unknowable ultimate existence, with Spencer, is an Absolute. This Absolute manifests itself in two kinds of phenomena—Mind and Matter. The entire phenomena has been going through an evolution, which consists in the change from a state of indefinite,

¹⁾ „In the „First Principles“ which forms the basis of the entire system, the fundamental axioms are set forth, which are afterward applied in the Principles of Biology, Principles of Psychology, Principles of Sociology, and Principles of Ethics“. Thilly, „History of Philosophy“, p. 535.

incoherent homogeneity to a state of definite, coherent heterogeneity. Mind is conceived as a factor in the phenomena of life. Life, H. Spencer, defines, is „the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations“. ^{1b)} Or more clearly „Life consists in the maintenance of inner actions corresponding with outer actions“. ²⁾ And the evolution consists in the attainment of an increasingly greater correspondence of the internal to the external. In this process of increasing adjustment or correspondence of the organism with the environment, mind appears as a factor of life in general. In tracing the course of evolution, we find ourselves passing, says Spencer, „without break from the phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life“. And then mental life, as a part of life in general, is itself conceived as „an adjustment of inner to outer relations“. Instinct, memory, emotion, reason, will etc. are „phases of the correspondence and factors in the correspondence“. Advancement in mental evolution as in that of life consists in increasingly better adjustment of the inner to outer. „Gradually differentiated from the lower order of changes constituting bodily life, this higher order of changes constituting mental life assumes a decidedly-serial arrangement in proportion as intelligence advances“. ³⁾ Further: „Though this serial arrangement never becomes complete, yet in the human consciousness it approaches completeness; . . .“. ⁴⁾

By „serial-arrangement“ with reference to mental life, Spencer means mind at such a stage of evolution, when it consists of a succession of mental states. Spencer holds that at the lower stages of evolution, this is not the case. Gradually as the intelligence advances, mental life would more and more assume a decidedly serial-arrangement. It is only in man that it approaches completeness, where the numerous impressions of the complex environment cannot be simultaneously attended to and have, therefore, to be arranged in a series.

In this connection, it may also be noticed that consciousness „can neither arise nor be maintained without the occurrence of difference in its state.“ Change or difference is essential to consciousness. Consciousness, as a matter of fact, appears in evolution only then when the numerous impressions require to be arranged in series for a proper adjustment to the environment.

Mind is also then a „vital action“. But a difference is drawn between the bodily and the mental „vital actions“. Spencer says, „The two great classes of vital actions called physiology and psychology are broadly distinguished in this, that while the one includes

^{1b)} H. Spencer „Principles of Psychology“ (1899) Vol. I, p. 293, § 131.

²⁾ H. Spencer „Principles of Psychology“ (1899) Vol. I, p. 293, § 131.

³⁾ „Principles of Psychology“ Vol. I, p. 406, § 181.

⁴⁾ „Principles of Psychology“ Vol. I, p. 406, § 181.

both simultaneous and successive changes the other includes successive changes only".⁵⁾

The idea of evolution may be said to be the characteristic thing of Spencer in psychology, as it also is in other sciences that he treated. He is anxious to trace and interpret the entire subject-matter of psychology evolutionally.⁶⁾ He declares at the outset of his work that „We are here primarily concerned with psychological phenomena as phenomena of evolution".⁷⁾ At another place emphasising the evolutionary standpoint of study, he says, „If the doctrine of evolution is true, the inevitable implication is that mind can be understood only by observing how mind is evolved".⁸⁾

Spencer distinguishes psychology into subjective and objective. Subjective psychology is concerned with the treatment of „the natures of particular modes of consciousness, as ascertained by introspection".⁹⁾ Objective psychology studies the mental phenomena from bodily behaviour. It studies mind through the physical conditions (nervous and organic structure and function) related to it.

Here it may also be noticed that the subject-matter of subjective and objective psychology are related to each other as the inner and the outer sides of one and the same thing. Surveying the whole range of animal kingdom, Spencer finds that the evolution of mind is accompanied by a corresponding organisation and evolution of the nervous system.¹⁰⁾ Therefore the mental phenomena, he says, „under their objective aspect, reduced to their lowest terms are incidents in the continuous redistribution of matter and notion".¹¹⁾ For this reason; it is considered important to know mind in terms of nervous changes. And throughout his work, Spencer attempts to give physiological explanations of psychological facts. This is further a characteristic of his psychology. It is, in fact, a consequence of the evolutionary standpoint.

⁵⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 395, § 177.

⁶⁾ Referring to the contents of his previously published articles „The Development Hypothesis" and „The Genesis of Science" which in certain ways suggested his work on psychology, he writes in his „Autobiography": „Hence arose the thought of writing a „Principles of Psychology tracing out the genesis of mind in all its forms, sub-human and human, as produced by the organised and inherited effects of mental actions." Spencer, „Autobiography" (1926) Vol. II, p. 11.

⁷⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 13, § 7.

⁸⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 291, § 129.

⁹⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 142, § 57.

¹⁰⁾ „ The development of Mind is fundamentally an increasing integration of feelings on successively-higher stages, along with which there go increasing heterogeneity and definiteness; and these traits answer to the traits in the evolution of the nervous system" Spencer „Psychology", Vol. I, p. 191, § 76.

¹¹⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 13, § 7.

Apart from his evolutionism Spencer is an associationist in psychology. Mind is considered to be composed of certain ultimate units, which combining and recombining with one another produce the higher and the more evolved stages of mind. The law of association is, to Spencer, only one and it is that of similarity.

„The proximate components of mind are of two broadly contrasted kinds — feelings and relations between feelings“. ¹²⁾ Feelings have „a perceivable individuality“ in consciousness, while the relations serve merely to unite them and on them they depend for their existence. They „may be divided into the feelings which are centrally initiated and the feelings, which are peripherally initiated — emotions and sensations.“ ¹³⁾ Besides these — emotions and sensations — which are called vivid feelings, there enter into the composition of mind faint feelings, „that have resulted from forgoing similar vivid feelings“. ¹⁴⁾ These are the „faint copies“ of the „vivid originals“.

But feelings are not the ultimate constituents of mind. Spencer says, „There may be a single primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness may be produced by the compounding of this element with itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher degrees: so producing increased multiplicity, variety and complexity.“ ¹⁵⁾ „.... something of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikeness among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of this ultimate unit“. ¹⁶⁾ But the nervous shock as a physical event is not the ultimate unit of consciousness. The mental factor corresponding to such shock is the unit.

These units then after the method of the elements of chemistry develop the more complicated processes of mind. He says, „The nature of mind, as thus conceived, will be elucidated by comparing it with the nature of Matter; and the fact that a parallelism exists between that which chemists have established respecting Matter and that which we here suppose respecting Mind, will help to justify the conception.“ ¹⁷⁾

Thus it is apparent that Spencer is an associationist; though his associationism is considerably modified by his genetic standpoint. Brett remarks in this connection, „From biology in general we are thus led to neurology and psychology. Having in this way prepared

¹²⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 163, § 65.

¹³⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 166, § 66.

¹⁴⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 182, § 73.

¹⁵⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 150, § 60.

¹⁶⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 151, § 60.

¹⁷⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 154, § 61.

a place for psychology, Spencer does little more than drop into the traditional Associationism“.¹⁸⁾

Here it will be important to particularly bring out a point from the above. We have seen that, according to Spencer, mind consists of „feelings and relations between feelings“. Feelings are to him, as they were to the Mills, any mental process. To the Mills mind was a succession of feelings alone. But it is characteristic of Spencer that he emphasises „relations between feelings“ as definite factors entering into the constitution of mind. Relations are further to him factors, which are associable and revivable. And even more, he says, „Relations in general are more revivable than feelings in general . . . the relation is more distinctly representable and more enduring in memory, than are its terms“.¹⁹⁾

Now his emphasis on relations is a very significant point. Thereby he lays a special stress on the continuity and unity of mental life, which to Hume and the Mills was a mere „sum-total“ or a „chain“ or a „series“ of discrete elements called „impressions“ or „feelings“.

Having thus sketched Spencer's general outlook in psychology, we can now pass on to his treatment of self.

The Absolute is the ultimate principle of existence, according to Spencer. It manifests itself in Mind and Matter. Now Mind and Matter, in this respect, run in parallel. In their ultimate character, they both participate in the Absolute and are, therefore, unknowable. But as phenomena they are knowable. Mind „as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is separable by introspection“²⁰⁾ can be known; but Mind „as the underlying something . . . of which they (the portions i. e. the mental, processes) are modifications“²⁰⁾ cannot be known.²¹⁾

Though unknowable, still that „underlying something“ or „the substance of mind“ is a real reality. „Series of impressions and ideas“ do not themselves constitute the entire mind. There is something necessarily besides them, a principle of unity and continuity. Spencer says, „Mind is that which persists in spite of all changes and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it . . .“²²⁾ Further the mind in the sense of „the

¹⁸⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, Vol. III, p. 213.

¹⁹⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 241, § 105.

²⁰⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 145, § 58.

²¹⁾ „ . . . just in the same way that the object is the unknown permanent nexus which is never itself a phenomenon but is that which holds phenomena together; so is the subject the unknown permanent nexus which is never itself a state of consciousness but which holds states of consciousness together“. „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 484, § 469.

²²⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 146, § 59.

substance of mind“ is the knower of the „series of impressions and ideas“, which are the known. And the knower must be distinct from the known, because „a thing cannot at the same instant be both subject and object of thought“.

This mind is a metaphysical existence. This is a „substratum, which can never be present“ in consciousness.²³⁾ With such a conception we are here not directly concerned.

Spencer affirms also the existence of an ego, self or subject (these terms are used by him interchangeably for the same thing) which is present in consciousness. This is the phenomenal or empirical self and is also characterised as the principle of „cohesion“ or unity in mental life. The self of one is constituted of „the aggregate of feelings and ideas“ which now exist in him plus the factor or factors that determine the „cohesion“ of this aggregate. Now the „cohesion“, he says, is determined by „experiences the greater part of them, constituting what we call his natural character by the experiences of antecedent organisms; and the rest of his own experiences“. ²⁴⁾

Now these experiences are present in the individual as „registered in his nervous structure“. So that, Spencer says, „Physically considered, the ego is the entire organism including its nervous system; and the nature of this ego is predetermined . . . “. ²⁵⁾ Further, it „includes all the functions carried on by these structures“. ²⁶⁾ This self, which effects cohesion among feelings is phenomenal, but is still recognised as a „portion of the unknowable power“. Spencer says, „the aggregate of feelings and ideas constituting the mental „I“, have not in themselves the principle of cohesion holding them together as a whole; but the „I“ which continuously survives as the subject of these changing states, is that portion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power called energy“. ²⁷⁾

²³⁾ „Spencer nimmt an, daß eine geistige Substanz den psychischen Erscheinungen zugrunde liegt. Da aber die unmodifizierte Substanz des Geistes in keinem Bewußtseinszustande zugegen ist, oder, wenn dies der Fall wäre, nicht zugleich Subjekt und Objekt des Denkens sein könnte, ist die geistige Substanz an und für sich ebenso unerkennbar als die materielle Substanz. Ueberweg-Hicks, (1928) Bd. V, p. 110.

But there is no mention here that Spencer recognises, besides this „Substanz“ a phenomenal self also, which so far as the empirical world is concerned determines the individuality or unity of a mind or person.

²⁴⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 502, § 219.

²⁵⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 504, § 220.

²⁶⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 504, § 220.

²⁷⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. I, p. 504, § 220.

A point may here be considered. The „cohesion“ in my present „aggregate of feelings and ideas“ is effected by the experiences partly of the antecedent organisms and partly of my own past life. These experiences are now existing in me as organic structure and function. They are the subject and the present „aggregate“ is the object. But, at the time of their occurrence, they were themselves objects. So that it is worth noting what was once itself an object, later on, becomes subject. Therefore the subject and object are not considered by Spencer to be qualitatively different.

Another thing may also be noted. Spencer is a parallelist.²⁸⁾ An interaction between the physical and the psychical is not possible. Then it may be relevantly asked, how can the past experiences of the antecedent organisms and of the present individual registered in the latter as organic structure and function may effect „cohesion“ in the present „aggregate of feelings and ideas?“ And how do they at all get themselves transformed into organic structure?

And a third thing also. The self of an individual is his „natural character“, which consists of his organic structure and function, resulting from the experiences of the race and the individual. Now this is particularly recognised as a „portion of the unknowable power“. But it is difficult to see how it can be more a „portion of the unknowable power“ than any other bit of phenomena.

But then there are a few points altogether characteristic of Spencer's account of self; and they stand out quite prominent particularly in contrast to the accounts of Hume and the Mills. Firstly, the unity in mental life is a point, which Spencer emphasises and seeks to provide for in so many ways. His treatment of „relations between feelings“ as important factors in the composition of mind shows his recognition of the fact of continuity and unity in mental life. Further the concept of self, whether metaphysical or phenomenal, are, at the first instance, principles which effect „cohesion“ between feelings and ideas. It will not be wrong to say that they are hypotheses to explain unity in mental life, which was to him as a given fact.

Unity of mental life is thus obviously recognised and emphasised by him. May we next ask whether he recognises any principle of activity in mind, or is it that the „feelings and relations between

²⁸⁾ (A) „To the absolute division of psychosis from neurosis, Spencer verbally commits himself . . .“ Brett, „History of Psychology“, Vol. III, p. 218.

(B) „The nature of this evolutionary scheme (of Spencer) is tersely expressed by saying that it postulates progress from the less to the more organised, from the automatic to the voluntary. It is a scheme intended to have reference to the nervous process only; consciousness, when it occurs, is a parallel phenomenon, which merely accompanies mental process“. Brett, „History of Psychology“, Vol. III, p. 102.

feelings“ account for the whole phenomena of mind, as feelings alone were expected to do in the case of Hume and the Mills. An explicit and a clear recognition of the fact of activity in mind one does not find. But still the things with him do not exactly stand as they did with the other thinkers, mentioned above. Firstly, the metaphysical „substratum“ of mind, which manifests itself in the mental processes, is a „force“ or „energy“. In that much there is an explicit reference of activity. But with regard to the phenomenal self, there is no such mention. Although it is still to be regarded as a „portion of the Unknowable Power“. And then it is something that determines „cohesion in our feelings and ideas.“ That kind of expression also suggests that some activity must be attributed to self. It will thus be seen that some play of activity in mind is recognised by Spencer, although it is not so clearly emphasised as is the fact of unity.

Further the concept of the biological organism plays an important part. The phenomenal self is constituted of the present organism with the whole history of its evolution registered in its structure and function. „Physically considered“, we have seen, he says, „the ego is the entire organism“ And the organism determines „cohesion“ in the „aggregate of feelings and ideas“ that appear in mind in succession. It may thus be observed that the unity of mind is founded in the physical organism.

The phenomenal self undergoes development. The child and the savage have not got the self-consciousness of an adult of the civilised society. „No urdlin, from the nursery“, says Spencer, „speaks of himself as „I“ Hearing of himself called „Gregory“ he will say „Give Gregory“. ²⁹⁾ So that a child treats of himself as an object or a third person at the most. For „That synthesis of all the experiences and powers, past and present, constituting the conception of self, is far beyond the ability of an undeveloped intelligence.“ ³⁰⁾ In the savage, the notion of personal identity is more developed, but still he has no words answering to mind and ideas“, he has „no name for „that which is conscious or consciousness“. He has got „the belief in another self that goes away in dreams“, but it is still „simply a duplicate, visible, and tangible as the body.“

Now the development from this primitive consciousness of personal identity to that of the civilised adult takes place through the increasing segregation or individualisation of the series of „vivid“ and „faint“ feelings, which correspond to „sensations“ and „ideas“ of modern psychology. This segregation or individualisation is principally promoted by the points of distinction existing between the two kinds of feelings. Spencer enumerates ten such points, e. g.

²⁹⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 370, § 404.

³⁰⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 370, § 404.

1. vivid feelings are unchangeable in their simultaneous and successive order by volition, while the faint are changeable; 2. vivid are predecessors in time; faint successors; 3. vivid are completely independent of the faint the latter are only partially independent of the former; and so on. The development of the contrast of subject and object is further helped by a number of other factors, of which the experience of resistance is the most important.

Spencer refers to the two kinds of feelings and coherence existing in each as facts of experience. „Simply by a process of observation we find that our states of consciousness segregate into two independent aggregates, each held together by some principle of continuity within it“. ³¹⁾ This „principle of continuity“ in the one, as also in the other, growing side by side leads to the development of the conceptions of self and not-self. „The principle of continuity, forming into a whole the faint states of consciousness, moulding and modifying them by some unknown energy, is distinguished as the ego; while the non-ego is the principle of continuity holding together the independent aggregate of vivid states“. ³²⁾

A little above we have seen that the self is constituted of the past experiences now present as „natural character“. „Vivid feelings“ are also a part of experiences. Therefore they also enter into the composition of self. But here „vivid“ and „faint“ feelings are referred to as respectively leading to the development of not-self and self. It is not quite clear how the „vivid feelings“ are to be understood in the two contexts.

We have seen before that J. Mill held as if consciousness of self is implied in every mental process. J. S. Mill differed, saying that in a case where memory is not present, it would not be possible. In the very beginning of our life, he holds it to be a valid possibility. Hamilton explicitly holds that self and not-self are known „in the same indivisible act of knowledge“. In every perception, he says, he is aware of himself „as the perceiving subject“ and of an external reality „as the perceived object“. Spencer, differing from Hamilton, holds that „... the consciousness of self and the consciousness of not self, are the elements of an unceasing rhythm in consciousness — a perpetual alternation, ordinarily so rapid as to evade observation, though occasionally so much retarded as to be observable“. ³³⁾ In support of his position, he refers to certain experiences. Firstly, there are occasions „when the external object or act is an astounding one, the observer partially loses consciousness of himself“. ³⁴⁾ In such cases the „impressions received from the external object . . .

³¹⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 487, § 470.

³²⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 487, § 470.

³³⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 438, § 439.

³⁴⁾ „Principles of Psychology“, Vol. II, p. 438, § 439.

monopolise consciousness, and keep out all those feelings and ideas which constitute self-consciousness".³⁵⁾ And then, „ self-consciousness, occasionally rises to a degree in which the individual is, as we say, absorbed in thought and oblivious of the things around".³⁶⁾ So that the consciousness of self and of not-self form „an unceasing rhythm". Now the one may be more emphasised, now the other. And sometimes the emphasis on the one may be so great that the other may be hardly observable.

Mill's reply to Comte regarding his position that mind cannot observe its own processes, we have already seen. Here we may notice the reply of Spencer also. Speaking in terms of a subjective and an objective psychology, as defined above, he states that according to Comte „a subjective psychology is impossible". But then, since „the essential conceptions, on which psychology in general proceeds are furnished by subjective psychology" and since „such words as feelings, ideas, memories, volitions have acquired their several meanings through self-analysis", it is obvious that „objective psychology can have no existence as such, without borrowing its data from subjective psychology".³⁷⁾ Further in such a case „objective psychology cannot legitimately use any terms that imply consciousness, but must limit itself to nervous co-ordinations as physical only".³⁸⁾

³⁵⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. II, p. 438, § 439.

³⁶⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. II, p. 439, § 439.

³⁷⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 141, § 56.

³⁸⁾ „Principles of Psychology", Vol. I, p. 141, § 56.

Chapter V

Bain

„Alexander Bain was the first to develop a doctrine, which is at once physiological and psychological; he is therefore the only one to whom we can look for a psychological system“.¹⁾ His work in psychology consists of: 1. „The Senses and the Intellect“; 2. „The Emotions and the Will“; 3. „Mental and Moral science“; first published respectively in 1855, 59 and 68. The psychological part of the last-named book is only an abridgement of the other two. The former two, as a matter of fact, constitute the principal source of his psychological opinions. They give comprehensive treatment of the mental processes describing also the physiological conditions attendant on them.

The method of his psychological procedure is that of „Natural History“. His emphasis is on the description and classification of the data collected. Höffding is reported to have said that Bain wrote psychology after the fashion of a botanist. Bain himself says in the preface to his second volume, „The Natural History Method, adopted in delineating the sensations is continued in the Treatise on Emotions.“

A few lines from Ribot will serve to give Bain's method much more exactly.

„Il faut appliquer à la psychologie la méthode des sciences physiques, disaient les Écossais. Il faut leur appliquer la méthode des sciences naturelles, dit M. Bain. Ceci demande à être expliqué en quelques mots. Sans rechercher si les Écossais ont réellement appliqué la méthode des sciences physiques, rappelons que cette méthode consiste à trouver des lois, c'est-à-dire à ramener les faits à des formules générales, souvent mathématiques qui expriment des rapports constants. La méthode du naturaliste est tout autre. Elle commence par une description exacte et complète des faits à étudier. Puis, comme les caractères ainsi déterminés, sont d'inégale valeur, que les uns sont essentiels et les autres subordonnés, il se présente ainsi un moyen naturel de mettre quelque ordre dans cette multiplicité, bref de faire oeuvre de science. Il consiste en une classi-

¹⁾ Brett, „History of Psychology“, Vol. III, p. 14.

fication faite d'après des caractères constants, ou comme le disent les naturalistes, dominateurs. En un mot, la méthode commence par la description et s'achève par la classification naturelle".²⁾

Physiology plays an important part in Bain's psychology. Throughout his work, there is a constant attempt to give physiological explanations for mental facts. His „activity“ principle, which was recognised by J. S. Mill as „the first capital improvement“ made by him on the psychology of his predecessors and contemporaries is also physiological in origin. The brain and the nerve-centres are the source of origin of this activity.

Brett, in this connection, remarks that Bain „took physiology as his ally, and so entered the field with a physiological psychology that was abreast of new movements, and could hold its own for half a century“. ³⁾

Physiology, we have said above, plays an important part in the psychology of Bain. But the exact nature of the relation between the mind and the body is not quite definitely ascertainable from those works of his, that we have referred to before. He says, „Although Subject and Object (Mind and Matter) are the most diametrically opposite facts of our experience, yet there is a concomitance or connection between mind and material organism“. ⁴⁾ „A concomitance or connection“ is here supposed. But the two are not the same thing. „Concomitance“ is a „connection“ of parallelism. And his treatment of the various mental processes also gives an impression of parallelistic relation between mind and body. For he is almost always attempting to give a „physical side“ to a „mental side“. The two are held parallel to each other in descriptions.

But there are evidences forwarded to prove that the „Brain is the principal organ of mind“. And he holds that „No fact in our constitution can be considered more certain than this, that the brain is the chief organ of mind, and has mind for its principal function“. ⁵⁾ And further, there is a definite statement. „The specific experiments on the nerve cords and nerve centres . . . have proved the immediate dependence of sensation, intelligence and volition on those parts“. ⁶⁾ In „Mental and Moral Science“ also one meets with a similar positive statement. Reviewing the subject historically, he says, „Descartes localised mind in the pineal gland; the schoolmen debated whether the mind is all in the whole body, or all in every part. Such expressions are unsuitable to the case. The connection is one of dependence, but not properly of local union“. ⁷⁾

²⁾ Ribot, „Psychologie anglaise contemporaine“, p. 251.

³⁾ „History of Psychology“, Vol. III, p. 204.

⁴⁾ Bain, „The Senses and the Intellect“ (1868), p. 10.

⁵⁾ Bain, „The Senses and the Intellect“ (1868), p. 12.

⁶⁾ Bain, „The Senses and the Intellect“ (1868), p. 12.

⁷⁾ Bain, „Mental and Moral Science“, p. 4.

The word „dependence“ suggests a relationship of interactionism. But it is much more likely that Bain conceived the relation between body and mind to be one of parallelism. For example, at another place, he says, „when the mind is in exercise of its functions, the physical accompaniment is the passing and the repassing of innumerable streams of nervous influence.“ A quotation from Lange, given below also supports the same opinion.^{8) 9)}

Evolution is, further, accepted by him as a fact also applicable to mind. He says, „We cannot exempt from the operation of the principle (of evolution) so important an organ as the brain; and with development of the brain proceeds, *pari passu*, development of the mind“.¹⁰⁾ And further, „the facts that constitute the proof of mental evolution fall under two heads: first, the strong resemblance between instinct and acquisition; second, the actual transmission of mental peculiarities known to be acquired“.¹¹⁾ But he does not proceed to treat the mental phenomena evolutionally as Spencer did. His aim is not to trace a mental process through the various stages that it has passed through in evolution!¹²⁾

⁸⁾ „Alexander Bain will einem „vorsichtigen und gemäßigten Materialismus“ huldigen, welcher den Kontrast zwischen Geist und Materie wahrte. Nach ihm, wie nach Spencer, ist der Körper dasselbe Ding, objektiv betrachtet, welches subjektiv in unmittelbarem Bewußtsein des Individuums, Seele ist. Durch diesen Gedanken, den man auf Spinoza zurückführen kann, und den auch Kant als Vermutung gelten ließ, läßt sich nun aber Bain verleiten, einen vollständigen Parallelismus zwischen Geistestätigkeit und Nerventätigkeit anzunehmen. Nach seiner Ansicht hat jeder Nervenreiz ein „sensationelles Äquivalent“. F. A. Lange, „Geschichte des Materialismus“, Volksausgabe, A. Kröner Verlag, Leipzig, II. Buch, III. Abschnitt, ch. III.

⁹⁾ „Wir haben schon gesehen, daß man Grund hat anzunehmen, jedem geistigen Vorgange, jedem Erwachen des Bewußtseins, jedem geistigen Uebergange gehe ein nervöser Vorgang parallel; ist der eine mehr oder minder intensiv, so muß es auch der andere sein. Dies ist das allgemeinste Verhältnis, daß wir in bezug auf den Zusammenhang angeben können.“ Geist-u. Körper, Bain, 1874.

This quotation from Bain's „Mind and Body“ definitely decides him for parallelism.

¹⁰⁾ Bain, „The Emotions and the Will“, (1880) p. 47.

¹¹⁾ Bain, „The Emotions and the Will“, (1880) p. 47.

¹²⁾ On the point of evolution Bain appears to have been influenced by Spencer. The chapter „Evolution, as applied to Mind“ did not exist in the 1st. edition of „The Emotions and the Will“. It appeared, for the first time, later. And then one gathers from the „Auto-biography“ of Spencer that he had published a criticism of the „Emotion and Will“ (1st. ed.) in which he had attempted „to show that the phenomena presented by the emotions can be truly understood only from the evolution point of View.“ (Auto-biography Vol. II, p. 46). Further on, at p. 99 of the same book, there is, then, an expression of satisfaction at „the readiness shown by him (Bain) to modify

We may next consider the exact nature and character of the principle of activity in his scheme of mind. This feature of his psychology is, in reality, very striking and more particularly after the Mills, because of the contrast between him and them, in this respect. They have no place for such activity in their psychology and he gives it a prominent place and employs it for the explanation of several mental processes.

Here it may also be noticed that „Movement and feelings of movement“ hold a prominent place in Bain's psychology. Sensations of movement are treated before the sensations of five senses. The reasons for doing so are: — „that movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of any stimulus from without; and that action is a more intimate and inseparable property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and, in fact, enters as a component part into every one of the senses, giving them the character of compounds while itself is a simple and elementary property“. ¹³⁾

The two, the activity and the muscular sensations are, in fact, closely connected. The ability to move and the sensations of movement are both primary facts of our constitution. A few lines from the preface of his former work may here be quoted: —

„In treating of the senses, besides recognising the so-called muscular sense is distinct from the five senses, I have thought proper to assign to Movement and the feelings of Movement a position preceding the Sensations of the senses; and have endeavoured to prove that the exercise of active energy, originating in purely internal impulses, independent of the stimulus, produced by outward impressions, is a primary fact of our constitution“. ¹⁴⁾

We may, then, proceed to consider the evidences, on the strength of which, activity or rather „spontaneous activity“, as it is called, is shown to be „anterior to, and independent of, the sensations of the the senses“. ¹⁵⁾

The „fact of the tonicity of muscles“ is regarded „as proving the existence of a central stimulus in the nervous system“. The fact of the permanent closure of the muscles called sphincters is also „an effect of the same nature as the tonicity.“ It cannot be due to an external impression. The activity of the involuntary muscles is further considered to show „the existence of a mode of originating with the nerve-centres“. And then, „the act of wakening from sleep can hardly be considered in any other view, than as the reviving of the activity by a rush of nervous power to the muscles, followed by

the expression of his views“ in a later edition of his Work. But, other wise or at least in the rest of their most characteristic points, the two contemporary psychologists developed their views independently of each other.

¹³⁾ „Senses and Intellect“. Third edition, (1868) p. 59.

¹⁴⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, Preface, III.

¹⁵⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 64.

the exposure of the senses to the influences of the outer world".¹⁶⁾ „The first gestures must be stimulated from within; afterwards, they are linked with the gestures and movements suggested by sense and revived by intelligence and will.“¹⁷⁾ This first gesture is determined by the „nourished condition of the nerves and nerve-centres, consequent on the night's repose The antecedent of the activity is physical rather than mental; and this must be the case with spontaneous energy in general“. ¹⁸⁾ It is here rather important to note that the „spontaneous energy in general“ is „physical rather than mental“.

„The early movements of infancy“ and of „young animal in general“ are also looked upon, „as in great part due to the spontaneous action of the centres“. ¹⁹⁾ And lastly, it is held, „that without spontaneity, the growth of will is inexplicable“.

These are some of the evidences adduced to establish the existence of „spontaneous activity“.

It may here be remarked that Bain's discovery of activity in mind was a great achievement for psychology. This, we have already said, was recognised by J. St. Mill. But this activity is traced by him from physical sources. It was, nevertheless, an important stimulus and suggestion to his successors to seek for the proper mental sources of mental activity.

It is next important, to note that apart from his „spontaneous activity“, Bain is an associationist. In the preface to his former volume, he says, „In treating of the Intellect, the subdivision into faculties is abandoned. The exposition proceeds entirely on the Laws of Association, which are exemplified with minute detail and followed out into a variety of application“. ²⁰⁾ In the treatment of emotions also, associationism plays a considerable part. Emotions are derived or compound feelings. „The modes of derivation or composition of the Emotions are various, but the leading circumstance is contiguous growth or the associating process“. ²¹⁾ Even the treatment of volition is associationistic. The doctrine of the „conflict of motives“ among other things is a feature of association psychology. But, it must not be forgotten, that Bain's associationism is modified by his doctrine of spontaneous activity.

We may now come to his conception of self. We have seen that with the Mills, the conception of self was psychological and empirical. With Hamilton and we might say, with some justification, even with

¹⁶⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 65.

¹⁷⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 66.

¹⁸⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 66.

¹⁹⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 67.

²⁰⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, preface IV.

²¹⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 69.

Spencer, it was primarily metaphysical. With Bain it is again purely psychological and empirical. „The proper meaning of self“, says Bain, „can be nothing more than my corporeal existence, coupled with my sensations, thoughts, emotions and volitions — supposing the classification exhaustive, and the sum of these in the past, present and future.“²²⁾ In brief, then, my „self“ consists of my physical body and the whole history of my mental experiences. „When „I“ walk in the fields there is nothing but a certain motive, founded in my feelings, operating upon my active organs; the sequence of these two portions of self gives the whole fact. The mode of expression „I walk“ does not alter the nature of the phenomenon.“²³⁾ The same thing is said in other words like this: „When what we have done is added to what we have seen and felt, the history of our self is complete.“²⁴⁾ Behind and besides these (the body and the mental functions) he sees nothing, to which the term self must more distinctively be applied. „No one can“, he affirms, „vouch for an inscrutable entity in the depths of our being, to which the name „I“ is to be distinctively applied, and which consist not of any bodily organ or function, or any one mental phenomenon that can be specified.“²⁵⁾ His spirit of investigation is strictly experimental. He has observed and classified the entire mental phenomena and feels that besides Feeling, Volition and Intellect, there is nothing in the mental world. With regard to the question: „Whether there be any residuum when the phenomena comprised under the common division are taken away?“²⁶⁾ he says, „I cannot light upon anything of the sort; and in setting up of a determining power under the name of „self“ as a contrast to the region of motives generated in the manner described, I see only an erroneous conception of the facts.“²⁷⁾

The self is, then, to him, „The sum-total of classified mental functions.“²⁸⁾ That is the character of the individual and that is his personality. The aims and ideals, the wants and desires of his life, are all included therein. The self, it may also be noted, according to Bain, includes within its constitution the tendencies and impulses to take interest in others as there are those which pertain to the individual alone. Further, the motives to change character or self are also recognised as a part of it.

A few words regarding the general character of Bain's account of self may here find place. But before that, to avoid any possible confusion, it may be pointed out that the word „feeling“, which was

²²⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 492.

²³⁾ „Mental and Moral Science“, (1884) p. 402.

²⁴⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 450.

²⁵⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 492.

²⁶⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 492.

²⁷⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 492.

²⁸⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. XXIX.

used by the Mills, also by Spencer, is used here again by Bain. But with Bain, it stands only for the affection or the pleasure-pain aspect of mental life. Besides it there are also volition and intellect. With the others, on the contrary, it meant, as has been before also given, any mental process.

Now, as we have before also mentioned, Bain's method in psychology is that of Natural History. His first anxiety is to describe and classify the data. Possibly his descriptive standpoint is responsible for emphasising the individual parts a little too much that their relation with the whole becomes comparatively loose. Self is to Bain „the sum-total of classified mental functions“. What does the expression „sum-total“ exactly mean? Does it not give a prior existence or at least a more significant existence to the „classified mental functions“ and a secondary existence to the mind or self itself, because it is the merest result of summing them up? And further is it true to say that „when what we have done is added to what we have seen and felt, the history of our self is complete?“ Does addition truly represent the nature of the relation between the parts and the whole in mental life? And is „history“ a mere summation of the past, present and future? This way of talk regarding the character of self is obviously not conducive to unity in mental life.

But, in another way, Bain seems to take note of this Unity. That is done through the „Law of Relativity“. The law says, „as change of impression is an indispensable condition of our being conscious, or of being mentally alive either to feeling or to thought, every mental experience is necessarily twofold. We can neither feel nor know heat, except in the transition from cold“. ²⁹⁾

In the end, we might consider his „psychological analysis of the distinction of subject and object“, i. e. of self and an external world. His treatment of this point is very similar to that of Spencer. It is in reality based on his treatment. But in place of Spencer's numerous points of distinction between subject and object, he gives only three principal points. They are:

I. „Movement (object) as contrasted with passive sensation (subject)“.

This implies the experience of resistance, which is commonly recognised as the most important factor, giving us the knowledge of an external world. Movement gives resistance and through that the object.

II. „Definite Feelings connected with definite movements (object); Feelings independent of our movements (subject)“.

This „includes the distinction of sensation and idea“, which, as a matter of fact, covers a large number of distinctions existing between the two.

²⁹⁾ „Senses and Intellect“, p. 8.

III. „Experience common to all (object), as against experience special to each (subject)“.

This is considered by Bain to be the most important „of all the tests of objectivity“. The object world is marked by the fact that „in it, different minds, in the same situation are affected in exactly the same way“. ³⁰⁾ On the contrary, „the subject world admits of great variety of modes in identical circumstances“. ³¹⁾

³⁰⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 582.

³¹⁾ „Emotions and Will“, p. 582.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

With Bain we have come to the close of our inquiry. May we here briefly review the progress of the inquiry, particularly to see the result of a period of active psychologising on an important subject.

Lodke brought into the history of thought in general and particularly of English thought his empirical outlook, also known as „the new way of ideas“. But his view of self, as, as a matter of fact, of many other subjects (e. g. the external world) is not purely empirical. Metaphysical issues are confused with psychological.

In him worked two motives. He wanted to trace all knowledge from ideas, but still the reality of a soul, God and external world appeared to him to be undeniable. He is, then, naturally, inconsistent in his theory to remain faithful to reality. Judged purely from the point of view of his premisses, it must be said, that there are quite serious inconsistencies in his thought. Otherwise, it must be acceded to him, that he did not fail to observe and emphasise unity and activity, the two very important features of mental life. Berkeley's philosophy, partly, removes the inconsistencies of Lodke's theory. But the existence of a spirit is still sacred to him. And he would rather say: When there is no idea of the soul, there is still a notion of it than deny its existence. The soul is a unitary and active principle and therefrom the unity and activity of mind are explicitly provided for. Hume is the philosopher, who boldly draws out the strict consequences of Lodke's theory. Only with impressions and ideas as objective mental processes, he shows that out of them the existence of a permanent abiding soul, God or a permanent external world is not traceable. If impressions alone form the premisses, an abiding existence cannot be given in the conclusion. Therefore self is „nothing but a bundle or collection of perceptions“. But it is obvious that when the premisses, which consist of only a succession of perceptions and therefore imply a denial of unity and activity in mind, it is then not possible to have them in the con-

clusion. Of course Hume had no place for unity and activity in mental life. The impressions as discrete existences are the units. And they themselves possess the quality of uniting with one another according to the laws of association. How is one, then, to evolve unity and activity out of these impressions?

Hume's standpoint is carried over to the Mills also. The elder Mill may be said to hold identically the same view as Hume. Instead of calling the self a bundle of perceptions, he says, „The life of one man is one series. The life of another man is another series“. But the belief of being the same person is differently explained by each. That we have seen in treating of J. Mill before.

J. S. Mill too starts from Hume's premisses. But he is a thinker, who may be said to resemble Locke, in as much as he, too, does not strictly aim at consistency in his theory. There plays in his mind also a second motive, similar to that of Locke. His theory entitles him to a view that the self is a series of feelings plus infinite possibilities of feelings. But his insight into the character of memory gives him a kind of unity, which the series themselves do not possess. He says, „The true incomprehensibility, perhaps is that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception accompanied by a belief of reality.“¹⁾

It will not be wrong to say that Mill observed that the past feelings (memory) and future feelings (expectation, which he recognised as a consequence of memory) were all present in mind as a unity. This fact, it must be admitted, he did notice. But then a series of discrete and disunited feelings cannot explain this „single present conception“. He, therefore, went beyond his merest series, and said that self is a „series of feelings“, but this series must be „aware of itself as a series“. Even that did not entirely satisfy him. Probably the difficulty lay in conceiving of a series which is aware of itself as a series. He, therefore, felt obliged to postulate an ego, which is a „common“ and a „permanent element“ among the series.

J. S. Mill, we have seen above, in a way recognises, unity in mental life, and that he attempted to provide for through his concept of an ego. And we have shown before that there are evidences to suggest that his ego is perhaps the principle of activity also. But a unity and activity in mental life is as much possible from his premisses as it was in the case of Hume.

Hamilton belongs altogether to another class of thinkers. He is more metaphysically and logically disposed than psychologically. The self is, then, naturally to him, at the first instance, a metaphysical entity. But it is the seat and the source of mental activity. His

¹⁾ „Examination“, p. 242.

emphasis on activity and unity of mind stands in sharp contrast to the „mental chemistry“ of J. Mill, which has room for neither.

His position in the context of other thinkers, here treated, is quite interesting. In the history of psychology an important question has been: „Whether the synthetic activity of the ego or the associative power of the ideas (as elements of consciousness) is to be emphasised.“ From Locke to Berkeley, Hume, the Mills, Spencer and Bain, all have more or less emphasised the associative power of the ideas. Hume and J. Mill, particularly, accepted it as the sole doctrine of mental life and tried to work it out consistently.

Hamilton, in contrast to them all, emphasises much more the activity of the ego than the associative power of the ideas themselves. He, in fact, does not attribute any such power to the individual ideas. In place of the laws of association he has got his law of Redintegration or Totality. The whole is more important than the items, which compose it. The whole is the unit with him, while with the rest the individual parts are the units. That is, further, an important point of difference between him and them.

Spencer's treatment is determined biologically and evolutionally. Self is constituted of the „aggregate of feelings and ideas“ of the present moment plus the factor or factors, which determine the „cohesion“ of this aggregate. Now the „cohesion“ is determined by the experiences of the antecedent organisms, constituting the „natural character“ of an individual and his own previous experiences. From this language, it is legitimate to infer that an individual is the sum-total of his own experiences plus the experiences of the antecedent organisms. So that he goes beyond Hume and the Mills, only in so far as he includes the experiences of the antecedent organisms also as a part of, in reality, the greater part of the self of individual.

But there is, besides, a metaphysical self also. Spencer, in the role of a metaphysician, regards self as a „Substratum“, a metaphysical entity. The exact nature of the relation between the self characterised above, and the self as a „substance“, is not quite easy to give.

Spencer, we have seen above, from his general psychological outlook is an associationist. But there are a few important points in which he distinguishes himself from strict associationism. Firstly, his emphasis on the „relations between feelings“ besides „feelings“ themselves is a distinguishing point of his psychology. He thereby observes and provides for a unity in mental phenomena, which Hume and the Mills did not and could not. Further, what is more particularly characteristic of him, is that his mental unity is, in another way, founded on the unity of a biological organism. Fact of unity is thus explicitly recognised and provided for. A principle of activity is not recognised in such clear terms. But his self whether phenomenal or metaphysical is the principle that determines

„cohesion“ in the mental states. And then his metaphysical existence is „energy“ and the phenomenal self is only a portion of that energy. All that suggests a kind of activising in mind.

With Bain, there is no metaphysics. Mind is studied as a part of natural phenomena. Self is to him, we have lately seen, „the sum-total of classified mental functions“. Feeling, volition and intellect are the three functions of the mind. Besides these three, there is nothing of a fourth class belonging to it. And the sum-total of feelings, volitions and intellectual processes is my „self“. Any self, in the sense of an entity behind and besides them, there does not exist.

Bain's outstanding merit consists in his explicit recognition of activity as antecedent to sensations in mental life. No other associationist before him had done that. His activity arises from physical sources. But it did stimulate subsequent psychologists to seek for it in mind itself. Otherwise his treatment of mind remains practically the same. He stands with Hume, the Mills and Spencer. The higher mental processes are built up of sensations by way of addition. His treatment of self illustrates the same thing. The self is a „sum-total“ of Feeling, Volition and Intellect. But will a mere addition of these processes make up the living reality of mind?

Bain, further, recognises the dynamic character of mind more than any other associationist did. Hume and the Mills speak of mind in altogether static terms. Even Spencer's language falls short of fully recognising the dynamic character of mind.

And then he goes beyond others in as much as he emphasises feelings and volitions as equally entering into the constitution of self as the Intellect. The others, but particularly Hume and the Mills are expressly intellectualistic in their conception of mind and self.

With regard to self, it may roughly be said, that Hume, the Mills, Spencer and Bain, all agree in holding that it is the sum-total of our experiences. They all evolve a subject out of objects. Subject as qualitatively different from the objects and as a necessary factor in the constitution of experience, they do not recognise. Spencer has got statements which do not seem to be easily reconcilable. A subject is argued out to be necessary and still the self is a pure product of experience. Hamilton, of course, urges on the necessity of a subject apart from the objects.

Whether a subject qualitatively different from objects is a necessary factor of experience (mental life) or not? is one of the most important questions, with which the subsequent psychology has had to deal.

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Lebenslauf

Ich bin am 13. Mai 1903 in Indien, in dem Orte Khurd, im Distrikt Jhelum, als Sohn des Staatsbeamten L. Bishan Das und seiner Ehefrau Sh. Bhagwanti Devi geboren. In den Jahren 1911 bis 1915 besuchte ich zunächst die Volksschule, alsdann von 1915—1918 die Mittelschule und später, von 1918—1920, die höhere Schule in Delhi. An dieser legte ich 1920 die „Matriculation“ ab, welche die Berechtigung zum Hochschulstudium verleiht. In den Jahren 1920 bis 1927 studierte ich mit einjähriger Unterbrechung an der Universität zu Delhi Naturwissenschaften, Philosophie, Sanskrit und englische Literatur. In dem Unterbrechungsjahr, 1922/23, oblag ich an einer medizinischen Hochschule in Indien dem Studium der Anatomie und Physiologie. Nach sechsjährigem Studium machte ich das M. A. Examen (Master of Arts). Im Jahre 1928 legte ich alsdann das rechtswissenschaftliche Examen als LL. B. ab.

Nach erledigtem Studium nahm ich im Jahre 1927 am „Hindu College“ zu Delhi meine Tätigkeit als „Lecturer“ auf, von der ich mich im Jahre 1931 für weitere Studien in Europa beurlauben ließ. Meine akademischen Lehrer in Indien waren in der Hauptsache die Herren Professoren C. C. Mitra, S. K. Sen, N. K. Sen. In Europa studierte ich zunächst in Basel bei den Herren Professoren Häberlin, Karl Joel und Schmalenbach, in Freiburg später bei den Herren Professoren Cohn, Honecker und Brie.

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Indra Sen.
